	20 March 1954
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GENERAL

1.	Bohlen analyzes Soviet pre-Geneva maneuvers:
25X1A	Ambassador Bohlen believes that Moscow is showing great sensitivity on the question of China's status at Geneva. This was revealed by its unusually swift reaction to Secretary Dulles' statement on 16 March that the Soviets were stalling and suggesting that there were differences between the Soviets and Chinese on Geneva arrangements. Bohlen argues that one of the Foreign Ministry's motives in announcing his interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov was to emphasize that Communist China had been consulted and had given its assent.
	Bohlen further suggests that this development "confirms the fact" of Sino-Soviet difficulties and reflects a Soviet attempt to move gradually toward the concept of a five-power conference with a special status for China.
	Comment: Statements of Soviet officials and propaganda since Berlin have attempted to disguise the fact that the agreement reached at Berlin falls far short of Molotov's proposal for a five-power conference. The omission of any mention of consultations with North Korea, and the report that both the Chinese and Soviet delegations will consist of 200 persons, also reflect Moscow's efforts to confer great-power status on Peiping.
	Available intelligence does not support the thesis that Moscow and Peiping are having difficulties over conference arrangements or are seeking to delay the Geneva conference.
	FAR EAST
2.	South Korean press reports government selecting Geneva delegates:
25X1A	A South Korean newspaper, the <u>Taegu</u> Shinmun, reported on 3 March that the government was engaged in selecting
	approximately 12 persons for its delegation to Geneva. The paper identified the source as a high-ranking South Korean official.
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	Comment: A report in late February, stated that President Rhee had selected William Glenn as the American adviser to the South Korean delegation. These are the only two reports noted to date that South Korea is making plans to attend.
	In view of Rhee's fear that Korea will be abandoned at Geneva, and his sensitivity over foreign "interference" with Korean affairs, South Korea will probably send a delegation regardless of the outcome of the current negotiations with the United States. 25X1A
	SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.	Vietnam reported demanding representation at Geneva:
25X1A	Vietnamese premier Buu Loc has insisted that the Associated States be represented 'as interested parties' at the Geneva conference. 25X1 25X1
	Meanwhile, current French-Vietnamese negotiations in Paris are stalled over Buu Loc's demand for a French declaration of Vietnam's independence, to precede a Vietnamese declaration of adherence to the French Union. French foreign minister Bidault wants both declarations issued simultaneously.
	Comment: Pending the outcome of the Paris negotiations, Vietnam has taken no public position on attending the conference. French Foreign Ministry spokesmen oppose having the Associated States at Geneva since their attendance would provide the Communists with a justification for inviting the Viet Minh.
4. 25X1A	Vietnamese official wants US to back no-surrender policy:
20/1/	Governor Tri of Tonkin told the American consul in Hanoi that most persons with whom he is in contact share his "profound discouragement" with the turn which French-Vietnamese discussions in Paris are taking.

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
Tri said that without a French affirmation of real Vietnamese independence, the Buu Loc government will be unable to take a firm stand against surrender to the Viet Minh--whether open or disguised. He added that United States support was essential to prevent any sellout at Geneva, or elsewhere.

American, as distinct from French, backing against the Viet Minh, Tri is expressing views long held by most non-Communist Vietnamese.

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6.	Communists may have ordered surrender of Indonesian insurgents:
25X1A	The American embassy in Diakarta reports
	that 164 members of the "Bamboo Spears," a Communist-oriented guerrilla force and
Į	Java, surrendered on 17 March. The Indonesian army commander in
	the area said this was the largest surrender to date and that the strength of the "Bamboo Spears" has been reduced by 80 percent as a result of this and other surrenders.
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The embassy speculates that such surrenders may be ordered by the Indonesian Communist Party to strengthen its demands for stronger government action against the Darul Islam.

Comment: This course would be consistent with the current Communist policy of cooperating with the leftist Indonesian government. The Communists stand to lose no military potential, since the surrendered personnel could be absorbed by a Communist-controlled veterans organization which is openly carrying on paramilitary training. The defense minister is on record as favoring the issue of arms to this group to help it fight the Darul Islam.



NEAR EAST - AFRICA

8. Arab-Israeli tension mounts: The Israeli government, under the moderate leadership of Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, is unlikely to initiate immediate major - 6 25X1A 20 Mar 54

25X1A		retaliatory action againg Jordan for alleged received. This seems clear despit from extremists, certainthe army and the public action.	nt acts of aggression. te strong pressure in elements within
	Amman, fully reconstruction government of Syr	Neither Jordan nor Syrirael. Jordan, according to Ambrognizes its military inferiority. The does not want to break its armoding to Ambassador Moose in Daniel	assador Mallory in The new caretaker nistice agreement
	they cannot preve Israel is already American militar refusal to hold hig	Comment: While restricted it will be prevent a major outbream of mounting diplomatic and propagations as an analysis and to any Arab state. Jordan of the current tension as an analysis and to any Arab state. Jordan of the current tension as an analysis and the current tension as an analysis and the current tension as an analysis and the current tension and tension and the current tension and the current tension and the current tension and the current tension and t	ak of hostilities, ganda warfare. rgument against will persist in its ael, and the Syrian
9.	Rift widening bety	veen Iraq and Egypt over Turkish	n-Pakistani pact:
25X1A	and other non-Ara said he would acc Communist.	Prime Minister Jamali apparently on 17 March open a "cold war" if Eg on Iraq's alleged negotiant states were not stopped within use the radio station of being pro-	, that he would yptian radio attacks ations with Pakistan three days. Jamali
	noticeably in rece	Comment: Relations beivals for leadership of the Arab nt weeks. Iraq has been promoting increasing independence of t	states, have cooled ing an Arab federa-
	Arabia. This, al ticipation in a for	Egyptian attacks on Irac ism from other Arab countries, ong with mounting internal oppos eign military alliance, makes it n himself with the West.	particularly Saudi ition in Iraq to par-
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EASTERN EUROPE

: !	10.	Comment on Polish party and government reshuffle:	
25	5X1A [The resignation of Bierut as premier de not significantly alter the power structuin Poland. He remains first secretary a head of the party. The change in Poland is in line with current Orlepolicy emphasizing collective leadership by separating the leaders of the party and government.	ire and thus
		In the Polish reshuffle the post of party chairman was dropped and one member of the politburo was replace. The size of the secretariat has been reduced to four members, not of whom occupies a position in the government.	red
2	25X1A	The new premier, Cyrankiewicz, a form Socialist and a member of the politburo of the Communist Party, we premier until November 1952, when the government was last reorganically and the community of the Communit	va s
		Wedner by Expos	
	44	WESTERN EUROPE	
25X1A	11.	French leak secret "American timetable" on EDC: 25X	<u> </u>
		Ambassador Bruce believes that certain French government officials deliberately disseminated the document to journalists as well as to political opponents of EDC. He states that the French government is itself to blain case of postponement of the EDC debate and is seeking an excuse shift the onus to the Socialist Party and to the American, British and West German governments.	o- ame
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The memorandum, according to Bruce, was a working document to show how United States assurances would fit into the program of measures of interested nations to make possible a debate and vote on EDC before the Easter holidays.

Comment: This further decreases the likelihood that Laniel will be able to adhere to his schedule for EDC ratification. The schedule provided for starting debate in the National Assembly before the Easter recess.

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